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Introduction 
 
 
EU Defence Policy Needs Strategy 
Time for Political Examination of the CSDP’s Reform Objectives 
Rosa Beckmann and Ronja Kempin 
The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has made great 
strides since publication of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016. Tectonic shifts 
in the geopolitical environment and within the Union itself have led the states and 
the Commission to launch a string of initiatives seeking to expand the EU’s strategic 
autonomy in security and defence. These efforts can only be sustainable if the projects 
involved are placed on a long-term footing and a process of reflection about the orien-
tation of the CSDP begins. Year two of EUGS implementation should be used to initiate 
steps in that direction. 
 
The EUGS has injected unforeseen dyna-
mism into security and defence policy, as a 
field hitherto largely unaffected by moves 
towards European integration and commu-
nitisation. The document came out during 
a phase of fundamental political/strategic 
recalibration driven by a string of internal 
and external factors. Internal pressures 
included the Brexit vote and electoral suc-
cesses for populist parties and movements 
channelling rising public demands for 
security. On the external front, Donald 
Trump is the first US President to openly 
question the existence of NATO, while the 
global security situation is increasingly 
characterised by hybrid threats and trans-
national terrorist operations. These devel-
opments led the member states and the 
Commission to make the promise of pro-
tection for its citizens into one of the cen-
tral planks of the EU’s legitimacy. 
Three Priorities for the Agenda 
In November 2016 the foreign ministers of 
the EU member states agreed to respond to 
these shifts with a comprehensive reform 
agenda for the CSDP, including extending 
common funding for EU Battlegroups 
beyond year end and intensifying coopera-
tion between the EU and NATO. In June 
2017 the member states also agreed to 
establish a Military Planning and Conduct 
Capability (MPCC) for strategic command 
of non-executive CSDP missions, such as 
the EU’s training missions. Otherwise the 
agenda concentrates on defence, in par-
ticular through three major projects to 
strengthen the ability of EU member states 
to defend themselves. 
First of all, Permanent Structured Co-
operation (PESCO) is to be activated. Intro-
duced under Article 42 (6) of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, PESCO permits member states 
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“whose military capabilities fulfil higher 
criteria and which have made more bind-
ing commitments to one another in this 
area with a view to the most demanding 
missions” to cooperate more closely than 
the EU-27 context permits. Under the terms 
of Article 46 PESCO is open to all member 
states, although the treaty text remains 
vague over the conditions they are required 
to satisfy. 
Secondly, a Coordinated Annual Review 
on Defence (CARD) will institutionalise sys-
tematic exchange between member states 
under the auspices of the European Defence 
Agency (EDA). This should contribute to 
identifying and closing gaps in member 
states’ military and civilian resources. 
Thirdly, the Commission and the member 
states have decided to establish a European 
Defence Fund (EDF) to incentivise coopera-
tion on the acquisition of key defence capa-
bilities. The EDF will co-finance initiatives 
where at least three EU states join forces to 
develop and procure defence products and 
technologies. This should permit states and 
companies to operate more cost-effectively; 
such initiatives benefit especially strongly 
from the fund where their cooperation falls 
within the PESCO framework. 
Clarify details, unlock potential 
While the ambitious timeframe requires 
the details of the three projects to be clari-
fied by autumn 2017, many questions still 
remain unanswered. The need to settle spe-
cifics should not, however, be allowed to 
obstruct progress on tapping the potential 
of the initiatives. 
PESCO as trailblazer for the Defence Union 
Concerning the criteria member states must 
satisfy in order to enter into a Permanent 
Structured Cooperation, there are currently 
two contrasting approaches: an agenda 
orientated on ambitious, exclusive projects, 
and an inclusive model designed to prevent 
the emergence of a multi-speed Europe in 
security and defence policy. Germany and 
France used their bilateral Ministerial 
Council on 13 July 2017 to propose a list of 
steps intended to satisfy both approaches. 
Under this proposal states would have 
to increase their defence budgets in order to 
participate in PESCO, honouring the 2014 
NATO agreement to spend 2 percent of GDP 
on defence, with 20 percent of the defence 
budget earmarked for acquiring major 
equipment. Secondly, states wishing to 
participate should join at least one PESCO 
project and support the work of the EDA. 
Thirdly there would be operational criteria 
to be met: representation in EU Battle-
groups, a substantial contribution to inter-
national operations, and above all acceler-
ated decision-making on military deploy-
ments. Finally, PESCO participants should 
participate in CARD and the EDF. 
It is presently unclear how many EU 
member states will be willing to fulfil these 
criteria. In addition, it is uncertain which 
specific projects can be realised under the 
PESCO framework. Here too, Berlin and 
Paris have done the groundwork for their 
partners, proposing more than a dozen 
projects including the creation of a logistics 
hub and a medical command. But political 
leaders need to do more than proposing 
individual projects and defining criteria. 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon the purpose of 
Permanent Structured Cooperation is not 
solely to strengthen the operative capabil-
ities of member states: It should be seen 
as the first step on the road to a European 
Defence Union. But the actual path for this 
has yet to be mapped out. As soon as PESCO 
has been activated, Germany and France 
should therefore join together to initiate a 
process of reflection to draw up a roadmap 
for the Defence Union. 
Incentives for CARD 
The idea of a Coordinated Annual Review 
on Defence has been around for longer 
than PESCO. CARD’s precursors are the 
Capability Development Mechanism intro-
duced in 1999, and its expanded successor 
of 2001, the European Capability Action 
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Plan. Those two initiatives fell by the way-
side, largely because member states balked 
at revealing gaps in their national defence 
capacities. Member states therefore need 
to be offered incentives for transparency in 
defence planning. This could involve link-
ing the coordination process to participa-
tion in PESCO and funding of procurement 
and research projects through the EDF. It 
would be conceivable to grant the EDA a 
right to propose or veto co-funded projects. 
In the medium term, member states and 
the EDA should move towards discussing 
strategic goals in the CARD framework. 
Only then will the coordination process 
offer a framework for advancing the EU’s 
strategic autonomy and supporting the 
goals of the EUGS. 
Move the EDF into the EU budget 
Funding for the EDF is secure through 
2020, when the next multi-annual financial 
framework (MFF) comes into effect. Given 
that the 2020–2027 MFF will presumably 
lack the British budget contribution, the 
Commission’s ambitious plans to provide 
the member states with €5.5 billion for 
joint defence development and procure-
ment are as yet unfunded. On the other 
hand, the fund can function to link dispar-
ate projects in the sphere of defence and 
increase the willingness of member states 
to participate in PESCO and CARD. The Ger-
man government should therefore ensure 
the fund’s survival by anchoring it in the 
next MFF. In this connection the Commis-
sion could also ensure that the EDF pri-
oritises funding for projects required to 
achieve the goals of the EUGS. 
A process of reflection on the CSDP 
The success of these initiatives will be closely 
tied to the question of what strategic goal 
the member states pursue through the 
CSDP – as a component of the EU’s Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
EUGS names strengthening resilience as 
the overarching goal of the CFSP – in other 
words reinforcing the EU’s ability to defend 
against internal and external threats. The 
High Representative’s implementation 
report of June 2017 spells out the implica-
tions for the CSDP’s future strategic goals – 
coping with external crises and conflicts, 
strengthening the partners’ capabilities 
and protecting the citizens of Europe. 
If coherence is to be achieved between 
initiatives and objectives, member states 
will have to find agreement over where 
resilience requires military capabilities, 
and in which crises and conflicts the latter 
are to be deployed. A joint threat evaluation 
will be required to determine what capac-
ities the EU needs to have at its disposal, 
and a shared concept for the strategic ob-
jective of guaranteeing the security of 
Europe’s citizens will need to be developed. 
This also means clarifying the relationship 
between NATO and the EU. While their 
joint declaration of July 2016 commits to 
deepening cooperation, the document con-
tains no indication of how PESCO, CARD 
and EDF should distribute defence func-
tions between the EU and NATO without 
duplicating structures. An overall approach 
dealing with that is a matter of urgency. 
Member states also need to decide how 
much sovereignty they are prepared to 
transfer to the EU level. That question has 
always been a red flag in the entire field 
of security and defence. Mastering a fluid 
security situation and exploiting the full 
potential of European integration will 
require the taboo on this discussion to be 
lifted and a realistic dialogue opened up. 
This also includes questioning the integra-
tion-inhibiting consensus principle in CFSP 
and CSDP. 
While Germany has always been scepti-
cal towards a strategic reflection process in 
the EU framework, the successes already 
achieved in implementing the EUGS should 
give Berlin grounds for optimism. According-
ly, Germany should advocate for a political 
process to clarify the strategic rationale 
of the CSDP. Two paths are open to the Ger-
man government. The first would be to 
advance this process jointly with France. On 
SWP Comments 34 
September 2017 
4 
the same lines as the proposal for PESCO 
criteria, Berlin and Paris could prepare a 
strategy paper for a future CSDP and cir-
culate it in the EU context. 
Another incentive for Berlin and Paris to 
lead the reflection process is that it would 
inject sustained EU-level momentum into 
the Franco-German motor. The circum-
stances are favourable, as the German Bun-
destag election in September 2017 will be 
followed by a period of four years where 
neither of the two countries are distracted 
by upcoming elections. For example, Berlin 
and Paris could prepare an aide-mémoire 
laying out common ground on threat per-
ception and the implicated capability goals. 
A considerably more ambitious option 
would be a joint white paper on European 
defence policy supplying political content 
and strategic guidance to the goals laid out 
in the EUGS. 
The second route would be for Berlin to 
argue for the member states to request the 
High Representative to prepare such a white 
paper – which would be seen as supportive 
by Germany’s partners in central and east-
ern Europe. In this version too, the central 
goal should be to spell out the capabilities 
required for implementing the EUGS. 
One thing is certain: while current pro-
gress on the European defence policy may 
appear promising, political discourse about 
the strategic orientation of the CSDP is 
urgently needed. Failure to do so would 
mean walking only half the path already 
started. 
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